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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over final orders, judgments and 
decrees of the Third District Court under Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3XJ). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah R. Civ. P. 68. Settlement Offers 
(a) Unless otherwise specified, an offer made under this rule is an offer to 
resolve all claims in the action between the parties to the date of the offer, 
including costs, interest and, if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract, 
attorney fees. 
(b) If the adjusted award is not more favorable than the offer, the offeror 
is not liable for costs, prejudgment interest or attorney fees incurred by the offeree 
after the offer, and the offeree shall pay the offeror's costs incurred after the offer. 
The court may suspend the application of this rule to prevent manifest injustice. 
(c) An offer made under this rule shall: (1) be in writing; (2) expressly 
refer to this rule; (3) be made more than 10 days before trial; (4) remain open for at 
least 10 days; and (5) be served on the offeree under Rule 5. 
Acceptance of the offer shall be in writing and served on the offeror 
under Rule 5. Upon acceptance, either party may file the offer and acceptance with 
a proposed judgment under Rule 5 8 A. 
i 
(d) "Adjusted award" means the amount awarded by the finder of fact 
and, unless excluded by the offer, the offeree's costs and interest incurred before 
the offer, and, if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract and not excluded by 
the offer, the offeree's reasonable attorney fees incurred before the offer. If the 
offeree's attorney fees are subject to a contingency fee agreement, the court shall 
determine a reasonable attorney fee for the period preceding the offer. 
Utah R. Evidence 702 Testimony by Experts 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the 
basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods 
underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are 
based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the facts 
of the case. 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the 
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the sufficiency 
of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are 
generally accepted by the relevant expert community. 
RESPONSE TO THE REIGHARDS' STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Many of the Facts set forth by the Reighards are irrelevant, conclusory 
and/or lack proper support from the record. The majority of their citations consist 
not of evidence properly presented to the jury, but rather to memoranda and 
affidavits submitted in connection with pretrial motions.1 To the extent these 
mischaracterizations bear upon this Court's analysis, these mischaracterizations are 
addressed in Mr. Yates' Argument. 
1
 The Reighards' "Facts" #s 1-9, 27-32,47, and 48, refer generally to their 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Dismissing Negligence Claim (1st Cause of Action) and Exhibits; "Facts" #s 12-15 
refer to the Affidavit of Suzy Reighard; "Facts" 16-18 refer to the Affidavit of 
Alan Reighard; "Facts" 22-24 refer to the Affidavit of Eugene Cole; "Facts" 33, 34 
refer to the Affidavit of Sattar N. Tabriz, P.E.; "Facts" 37, 38 refer to the Affidavit 
of Shaan Sanderson. Mr. Yates sought to strike all of those affidavits; (R. 510-12; 
650-52); the court never ruled on these motions, rather indicating that it would 
"consider only the admissible portions of this and any other pleadings." (R.782) 
In many instances, those Affidavits were inconsistent with the testimony adduced 
at trial. See R. 1700-03, generally. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
REPLY TO APPELLEES1 BRIEF 
L BECAUSE MR. YATES OWED NO INDEPENDENT DUTIES, AS 
AFFIRMED BY DAVENCOURT, THE JURY'S AWARD FOR 
NEGLIGENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, 
As acknowledged by both parties in this matter, Mr. Yates acted as his own 
contractor when he built his home. However, when Mr. Yates sold the home to the 
Reighards nearly 2 lA years later, his only relationship with the Reighards was as 
the seller of a knowingly used home. 
The Reighards rely largely upon Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App. 101, 158 
P.3d 562, in arguing that Mr. Yates had independent duties as the builder of the 
home. The Moore case is legally distinguishable, because it did not even include a 
negligence claim. 2007 UT App 101, f 7 ("The Moores filed this action in August 
2000, alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent 
nondisclosure, fraudulent misrepresentation, and violation of Utah's Consumer 
Sales Practices Act.") The duty established in Moore arose in connection with "a 
duty to disclose material information..." Id at f36. On remand, the jury was to 
determine "whether the [Seller] had knowledge of the defects." In this case the 
jury was specifically asked if Yates used reasonable care in determining the truth 
of his assertions, and they found that he did (R.1446). The jury's determination in 
4 
this regard is subject to reversal only if no substantial evidence, or insufficient 
evidence, supports it. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, f 100; 130 P.3d 325. The 
court must "assume that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence which 
sustain its findings and judgment." Stevensen 3rd E., L.C. v. Watts, 2009 UT App 
137, f 26, 210 P.3d 977 (internal citations omitted). 
Moore is also factually distinguishable from the instant case because the 
builder in Moore only lived in the home for three (3) weeks and had contracted 
with the Moores to sell the home before the construction of the home was 
complete. Moore, 2007 UT App. 101, Fn. 11. In contrast, Mr. Yates built the 
home intending it to be his own residence and lived in the home for nearly 2 Vi 
years before selling the home to the Reighards. (R.320). In Moore, the purchasers 
intended to purchase a new home and did so; in the instant matter, the Reighards 
intended to, and did in fact, purchase a used home. 
Davencourt clearly clarified any ambiguity in Moore and Yazd and held that 
there is no independent duty to act without negligence in the construction of a 
home or to conform to building codes, Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing 
Homeowners Association v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC, 2009 UT 65, f 44 
("No common-law duty exists that creates a duty to conform to building codes.55), 
f47 ("[T]he district court properly rejected the independent duty to act without 
negligence in the construction of a home."), 221 P.3d 234. 
5 
In response to Mr. Yates' argument regarding the applicability of 
Davencourt, the Reighards simply respond by saying that "the failure to conform 
to the building codes is a breach of Mr. Yates5 independent duty as the 
contractor/builder/seller of the residence." Brief of Appellees and Cross-
Appellants, p. 27. However, they cite no support for this contention and appear to 
confuse the issue of who owes the duty and what duty is actually owed. 
The only independent duty that Utah courts have recognized for a 
contractor-seller is an independent duty to disclose known material information 
regarding the real property. Davencourt, 2009 UT 65, Fn. 4 (citing Yazdv. 
Woodside Homes Corporation, 2006 UT 47, f35, 143 P.3d 283 (holding that a 
contractor-seller owes a home purchaser "a duty to disclose information known to 
him concerning real property"); Moore, 2007 UT App. 101, f 36 (ruling that a 
contractor-seller owes a duty to disclose material information to home purchaser)); 
see also Sunridge Development Corporation v. RB&G Engineering, Inc., 2010 UT 
6, Fn. 8, 230 P.3d 1000 (stating that "the independent duty in Yazd was a duty to 
disclose known and material defects, not an independent duty to refrain from 
acting negligently"). This duty to disclose is unrelated to conforming to building 
The absence of duty in this case is also evident because the duties that Yates 
owed as a builder (if any) were owed only to himself as the owner/occupant. The 
Reighards cite no case which suggest that a contractor's duty to a purchaser (if 
any) extends to subsequent purchasers. 
6 
codes in the construction of a residence and as stated previously, Davencourt 
specifically holds there is no independent duty to build in conformity with the 
building code. Davencourt, 2009 UT 65, ff 41, 43. 
In addition, and notably, the Reighards do not address Mr. Yates' further 
contention that there is no independent duty to act without negligence in the 
construction of a home. Davencourt, 2009 UT 65, f47. The Reighards' arguments 
that somehow the current state of the economy, Mr. Yates' trial strategy regarding 
experts, and the Reighards' self-serving and conclusory statements as to what Mr. 
Yates "conceded" in his deposition testimony are irrelevant to this independent 
duty analysis. 
Because of the lack of independent duties, and because the economic loss 
rule is applicable (as discussed below), this Court can and should set aside the 
jury's award for negligence. 
See Brief of Appellees and Cross-Appellants, p.24. Mr. Yates also points out the 
much of the deposition testimony referenced by the Reighards is not part of the 
record, and is not contained in R.397-415 and Exhibit "A," as cited by the 
Reighards. 
7 
II. THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE AS THE 
REIGHARDS HAVE FAILED TO PRESENT ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
OF BODILY INJURY. 
In responding to Mr, Yates' arguments regarding lack of evidence regarding 
bodily injury in this matter, the Reighards counter by stating they "presented 
evidence at trial of the personal injuries and illness which Alan and Aidan suffered, 
which is itself directly attributable to Mr. Yates9 substandard and negligent 
workmanship in the construction of the Residence." See Brief of Appellees and 
Cross-Appellants, p. 28. As support for this contention, they simply cite to the trial 
court's ruling (R.1627), which contains no such assertion.4 
In reality, this contention is conclusory and untrue. While Mr. Reighard and 
Aidan Reighard may have suffered physical symptoms, there was no evidence that 
such effects were due to Mr. Yates' actions or inactions. The Reighards' 
contention completely ignores that they lived in the home for nearly two (2) years 
before experiencing any physical symptoms. (R.481, f 13). The Reighards' 
contention also completely ignores that during their ownership, the Reighards had 
4
 The trial court stated as follows: "Here, the jury found both economic and non-
economic loss and awarded damages in a special verdict interrogatory. The court 
cannot and need not speculate what that was based upon, but it is clear some of the 
award was for non-economic damages and there was evidence offered relating to 
illness of a child." (R.1627). 
8 
various unidentified sprinkler repairs performed5 after moving into the home and 
they had a deck installed where the deck contractor "scraped [] off the top layer of 
soil on the corner of the house where the mold was [later] discovered." (R. 248-
49,360-361). 
The Reighards' contention also ignores the fact that neither of the two (2) 
medical doctors that testified at trial testified with any reasonable medical certainty 
that the alleged health effects suffered by Mr. Reighard and Aidan Reighard were 
causally connected to the mold found in the home. (R. 1700 at p. 65, 1701 at p. 
145). And despite the Reighards potential confusion of the issue in their Statement 
of Facts No. 21, Dr. Cole, a Ph.D., did not testify as to causation of the health 
effects due to exposure to the mold. In contrast, Dr. Cole testified as follows: 
Q. You don't make any conclusion in your report as to medical causation 
between the mold and the symptoms that Alan or Aidan Reighard suffered; 
correct? 
A. I've looked at potential associations and relationships between the 
adverse environmental conditions and their adverse health symptoms. 
5
 Yates sought to compel production of evidence respecting the nature of the 
Reighards' sprinkler and landscaping repairs (R.621-22A), and when no such 
evidence was produced, Yates sought a jury instruction respecting spoliation in 
connection with the Reighards' failure to produce evidence (R.1702, p. 207). That 
requested instruction was denied. 
9 
Q. But that is not a determination of medical causation between the 
conditions and their symptoms; correct? 
A. Correct. I'm not a medical doctor. (R.1700, p. 46). 
In addition, the jury awarded $0.00 in medical expenses. (R. 1445).6 
Clearly, the jury found that Mr. Reighard and Aidan Reighard suffered no physical 
injury that required compensation for medical expenses. As such, it is improper for 
the Reighards to speculate that all or part of the $2,500.00 awarded to the 
Reighards for non-economic damages (R.1445) stemmed from the physical effects 
allegedly suffered by Mr. Reighard and Aidan Reighard. The non-economic 
damages could just have easily been awarded for stress and inconvenience 
involved in repairing the home. Without clear evidence that physical injuries 
occurred in this matter, the Reighards claims are barred under the economic loss 
doctrine. 
6
 The Reighards incorrectly assert that Yates' counsel failed to request an 
instruction respecting the need to prove personal injury damages with a reasonable 
medical certainty (Appellees' Brief, Statement of Facts, f 55). In fact, Yates' 
counsel raised and preserved this issue (R.1702, p. 197). ("The jury instructions do 
not adequately establish the specifications which medical-with which (sic) medical 
damages need to be proven.") At that point, the judge adjourned to finalize the 
instructions, without including the requested medical damages instruction. 
10 
III. DR. EUGENE COLE, A PH.D., SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
ALLOWED TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL REGARDING THE EFFECTS OF 
AND EXPOSURE TO THE MOLD 
Mr, Yates has thoroughly briefed this issue related to Dr. Cole in his initial 
Brief and will respond as succinctly as possible to the issues raised by the 
Reighards. Utah R. Evid. 702 only allows for expert testimony that is (1) reliable, 
(2) based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) has been reliably applied to the facts 
of the case. Dr. Cole's training and experience is irrelevant to the only relevant 
issue—whether or not Mr. Reighard's and Aidan Reighard's alleged symptoms 
were caused by the mold—and as such, his testimony should have been excluded 
under Utah R. Evid. 702. 
The Reighards argue that Dr. Cole visited the Reighards' residence in 
preparation for his testimony, in an attempt to shore up his credibility. However, it 
is undisputed that his visit occurred long after the mold had been remediated. 
In regard to Mr. Yates' argument that Dr. Cole could not testify as to the 
specific details about the mold in the residence, the Reighards respond by simply 
saying that mold can grow slowly and Dr. Drage has never seen Mr. Reighard and 
n 
7 
Aidan Reighard with symptoms as serious as they were. See Brief of Appellees 
and Cross-Appellants, p. 32. These arguments have absolutely no bearing on the 
issue. Clearly, if Dr. Cole had no information as to the type of mold or fungus that 
was growing in the Reighards' home, any opinions he would have would be 
unreliable. 
The Reighards also attempt to shore up their arguments in favor of Dr. Cole 
by citing to testimony given by Dr. Drage and Dr. Cheung at trial. Again, it is 
entirely irrelevant to Dr. Cole's credibility that Dr. Drage testified about Aidan's 
allergy tests or that Dr. Cheung admitted there was mold in the residence and that 
it was prudent to remove the mold. See Brief of Appellees and Cross-Appellants, 
p. 33. The focus is on Dr. Cole and whether or not Dr. Cole had the ability to 
properly testify as an expert. 
Finally, the Reighards cannot get around the fact that Dr. Cole had no 
information as to the type of mold to which the Reighards were exposed, Dr. Cole 
7
 These explanations are, of course, materially inconsistent. If mold was growing 
slowly, the Reighards' alleged medical symptoms should have also extended over 
a long period of time. The inconsistency of the explanations reflects the 
speculative nature of any connection between the existence of mold and alleged 
symptoms. 
12 
had no information as to the duration of any exposure to mold, Dr. Cole relied 
upon his own interpretation of medical records (although he is not an M.D.) and 
inconsistent testimony from Ms. Reighard as to the extent and timing of the 
symptoms allegedly suffered by Mr. Reighard and Aidan,9 and the fact that Dr. 
Cole is not a medical doctor and cannot testify as to medical causation but only to 
"potential associations and relationships."10 As such, Dr. Cole should not have 
been allowed to testify at trial. 
IV, THE REIGHARDS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED COSTS 
AS PART OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT 
In arguing that the "adjusted award" under Utah R. Civ. P. 68 was more 
favorable than Mr. Yates' $10,000.00 Offer of Judgment, the Reighards simply 
speculate as to the amount of attorney fees that may have been incurred between 
January 2007 and September 2007. See Brief of Appellees and Cross-Appellants, 
In response to the jury's question as to how long the mold had been growing, Dr. 
Cole stated he could not answer the question "[b]ecause we don't have a 
knowledge of when the water intrusion started, and it could be weeks, it could have 
been months." (R.1700, p. 53). Of course if it had been only weeks or even 
months, it would remove any possibility of improper nondisclosure by Mr. Yates, 
as the transfer of property had occurred over two years prior. 
9
 R.1700, pp. 39,41-43. 
10
 R.1700, p. 46. 
13 
p. 36.11 Again, speculation has no place in this matter and as the trial court did not 
consider the issue of attorney fees in this context, it would be improper for this 
Court to do so. 
V. MR. YATES, AND NOT THE REIGHARDS, PREVAILED AND, AS 
SUCH, SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS 
In their brief, the Reighards assert they were the prevailing party in this 
matter based upon the "net judgment rule." See Brief of Appellees and Cross-
Appellants, p. 41 (citing Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551 
(Utah App. 1989)) {Mountain States I). However, while courts take this rule into 
consideration in their prevailing party analysis, the net judgment rule is only a 
"good starting point," but it should not be "mechanically applied." Olsen v. Lund, 
2010 UT App. 353, f7, 671 Adv. Rep. 7 (internal citations omitted). Courts should 
The Reighards not only failed to present any evidence as to fees incurred prior to 
this date; they failed to properly present evidence to support any of their fee claim. 
Their Affidavit of Attorneys5 Fees failed, in numerous respects, to provide the 
information required. See Declaration of Christine E. Drage, Esq. (R. 1468-72) 
seeking $277,100.00 in attorney fees without any detail or support; following 
Yates' objection to that Affidavit, the Reighards submitted the Declaration of 
Trevor Resurreccion (R. 1541-44) which still failed to identify the matters required 
to support an award of attorneys' fees. 
The Reighards5 reliance on Mountain States refers only to the initial opinion; on 
re-hearing of that very case, as reflected in the reported opinion, the Court of 
Appeals noted that the court's initial opinion contained an "oversimplification in 
our opinion which warrants comment and clarification." (783 P.2d at 557) the 
court clarified, "nothing in our opinion should be taken to suggest that the net 
judgment rule can be mechanically applied in all cases..." 
14 
take a flexible and reasoned approach and "look[] at the amounts actually sought 
and then balanc[e] them proportionally with what was recovered." Olsen v. Lund, 
2010 UT App. at f7 (citing A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen, 2004 
UT 47426, 94 P.3d 270). 
The Reighards were awarded a final judgment against Mr. Yates in the 
amount of $7,500.00 plus costs; this award was based solely upon the Reighards' 
negligence cause of action. (R.1445, 1627). However, Mr. Yates prevailed on the 
other six (6) causes of action that were brought against him by the Reighards. In 
addition, the $7,500.00 awarded was significantly less than the $100,000.00 that 
the Reighards sought as part of their closing argument. 
In reality, Mr. Yates prevailed on 86% (= 6/7) of the claims brought against 
him and the jury awarded the Reighards only 12.5% (= $12,500/$100,000) of the 
damages they sought on the sole remaining claim (R. 1445); the trial court later 
reduced this percentage to a mere 7.5% (= $7,500/$ 100,000) after reducing the jury 
verdict by the $5,000.00 settlement with E. Marshall Plastering. (R. 1627). Under 
the "flexible and reasoned approach," Mr. Yates clearly prevailed in this action. 
Further, Mr. Yates prevailed on the Breach of Contract Cause of Action, the 
only cause of action that provides for attorney fees. (R. 1448). Still further, and as 
outlined above, Mr. Yates should have also prevailed on the negligence cause of 
action, causing him to prevail on every cause action, and clearly making him the 
15 
prevailing party. As such, the trial court erred in ruling that this case was a 
"draw." (R. 1632). See also Olsen v. Lund, 2010 UT App. 353,1fl[8,l4; Mountain 
States Broadcasting Co. v Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 558 (Utah App. 1989)(describing a 
50% recovery as a draw). 
The Reighards make the argument that Mr. Yates cannot be the prevailing 
party because he refused to accept an Offer to Compromise from the Reighards in 
June 2008. See Brief of Appellees and Cross-Appellants, p. 38. This argument is 
unsupported by any authority, as there is no authority to support such claim. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 68 deals with costs and attorney fees, not whether a party is or is not the 
prevailing party and has no bearing on the prevailing party analysis. 
Further, the Reighards take issue with the fact that Mr. Yates never filed a 
Motion for Attorney Fees. However, failure to file a formal motion does not fail to 
preserve an issue on appeal. O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, f 18,217 P.3d 704 
(stating that to properly preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be timely and 
specifically raised and must be accompanied by evidence or relevant legal 
authority). Mr. Yates raised the issue of attorney fees in his Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Expert Costs 
and specifically stated "Defendant will by separate motion, seek an award of his 
attorney fees. That motion, however, is arguably premature in light of the 
pendency of other motions." (R. 1515). Based upon Judge Lubeck's unfavorable 
16 
rulings on the post-trial motions, an attempt by Mr. Yates thereafter to file a 
Motion for Attorney Fees would have been fruitless if not also improper. 
Finally, the Reighards claim that Mr. Yates has made this a "make work" 
case, and therefore he should not be awarded any attorney fees.14 See Brief of 
Appellees and Cross-Appellants, p. 38. Mr. Yates vigorously denies this allegation 
and it has no place in the prevailing party analysis. "None of our cases weigh the 
result achieved at trial against the sacrifice in time, trouble, and expense required 
to attain that result... [w] hen our cases speak of the 'comparative winner,' the 
comparison is to the other party, not to the toll of the litigation process." Olsen v. 
Lund, 2010 UT App. 353, f 12 (internal citations omitted). 
11 _ The Reighards also argue that they "were never given the opportunity to respond 
to such a request [for attorney fees], and Mr. Yates failed to produce any evidence 
of the amount of attorney's fees that he could possibly be seeking" and therefore 
Mr. Yates should not be awarded attorney fees. Brief of Appellees and Cross-
Appellants, p. 37. However, the issue of the amount and reasonableness of any 
attorney fee award would be remanded to the trial court, making the Reighards' 
concerns in this regard unwarranted. And, it is hard to imagine how the Reighards, 
who sought compensation for 1,108.4 hours, could challenge the reasonableness of 
Yates' counsels' less than 800 hours. (R.1512, p.6, fn 3) 
14
 Again, the argument is contrary to the hours incurred by the parties' counsel 
through trial; Plaintiffs sought compensation for about 40 percent more hours than 
Defendant had incurred through trial. (R. 1512, p.6, fii 3) 
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RESPONSE TO BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE!S 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT'S REDUCTION OF THE JURY'S VERDICT 
FROM $12,500 TO $7,500 WAS APPROPRIATE 
Mr. Yates sought, in this case, to have the jury instructed respecting 
apportionment of damages. (R.1229, R.1702 at p. 178). The Reighards argued 
against apportionment and the trial court denied Mr. Yates' request. (R. 1702, pp. 
175-177, 182). Instead, the court provided the jury with Jury Instruction No. 43, 
which provided in pertinent part, "If there was such a settlement involving 
compensation, and you return a verdict for Plaintiffs and award damages, I will 
make any proper adjustments of your award to Plaintiffs." (R.1430). 
In this case, the award of $12,500.00 was awarded in connection with the 
negligence cause of action. (R.1445). Based upon the court's jury instructions, the 
court properly reduced the jury's finding of $12,500.00 by the $5,000.00 received 
by the Reighards from E. Marshall Plastering. The Reighards cannot argue against 
apportionment and for a reduction in the jury verdict in connection with the jury 
instructions (R.1702, pp. 175-177, 182) and thereafter take an about face arguing 
that the court erred in reducing the award. 
On December 30,2010, Mr. Yates filed a Motion to Dismiss the Cross Appeal. 
The arguments presented below are presented in the event that the Cross Appeal is 
not dismissed. In presenting these arguments, Mr. Yates does not waive his 
argument that the Cross Appeal was untimely, and should be dismissed. 
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The Reighards argue that the jury's finding of $12,500.00 may have been 
based upon Mr. Yates' own negligence; the Reighards speculate the jury may have 
awarded those damages based upon the grading. Obviously, such speculation has 
no place. Furthermore, it was the jury's determination that the total of the damages 
suffered by the Reighards as a result of Mr. Yates' negligence (including the 
alleged negligence in overseeing the subcontractors) was $12,500.00. Regardless 
of whether that is to compensate for grading, or stucco, or window, or sprinkler 
installation, the jury awarded $12,500.00 in total damages and this amount must be 
reduced by amounts received from other parties. 
The Reighards' argument that E. Marshall Plastering needed to be joined in 
connection with apportionment is inaccurate. The Reighards themselves attempted 
to join E. Marshall Plastering in an untimely fashion; this request was denied. 
(R.741, 899-900). The fact that E. Marshall Plastering was not joined does not 
change the fact, however, that the Reighards received $5,000.00 from E. Marshall 
Plastering, and the trial court determined it would appropriately reduce the jury's 
verdict, once determined, based upon amounts already received by the Reighards. 
Having made this determination, having instructed the jury that this would be 
done, and having responded to Mr. Yates' request for apportionment by indicating 
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this would be the resolution, this Court appropriately reduced the jury verdict to 
$7,500.00.16 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY UPHELD THE 
JURY'S VERDICT IN FAVOR OF MR. YATES REGARDING THE 
BREACH OF CONTRACT AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
CAUSES OF ACTION17 
At the close of trial in this matter, the jury found in favor of Mr. Yates on 
both the breach of contract and the negligent misrepresentation causes of action. 
(R. 1446-1448). After the trial, the Reighards filed a Partial Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict seeking a reversal of these findings. (R. 1495-96). 
This Motion was denied by the trial court (R.1635) and this Court should affirm 
that denial. 
The Reighards base their arguments related to both the breach of contract 
claim and the negligent misrepresentation claim largely on the premise that it does 
not matter whether Mr. Yates had actual knowledge of the construction defects at 
The Reighards' contention that fault cannot be apportioned to non-parties is also 
legally inaccurate; Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-821(4) specifically allows the 
apportionment of fault to identified non-parties in this case. E. Marshall Plastering 
was clearly known to be a potential tort-feasor to both parties, from the outset of 
the litigation. 
1 *7 
The Reighards incorrectly set forth the standard of review for denial of a 
judgment notwithstanding a verdict; the case that they cited clearly states: "We 
reverse only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who 
prevailed, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict." 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). 
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the residence or not. This is not the appropriate standard for negligence, and it is 
clearly not the appropriate standard with respect to the contract. 
The appropriate standard is whether or not Mr. Yates had actual knowledge 
of material information regarding the property. The Seller Disclosures, which 
contain the alleged "misrepresentations" by Mr. Yates clearly indicate that the 
standard is actual knowledge. The Disclosures required Mr. Yates to "thoroughly 
discuss [his] actual knowledge regarding the condition of the Property" and by 
signing the Disclosures, Mr. Yates verified that the "information contained 
[therein] [was] accurate and complete to the best of [Mr. Yates'] actual knowledge 
as of the date signed by [Mr. Yates]." (R.001 (Complaint) at Exhibit "B," pp. 1, 
5)(emphasis added). 
In addition, the independent duty of a contractor-seller (if Mr. Yates owed 
any such duty to the Reighards) is to disclose known material information 
regarding the property. Davencourt, 2009 UT 65, f 30 ("A contractor-seller owes 
an independent duty to a home purchaser to disclose known material information 
regarding the real property.")(emphasis added)(citing to Yazd, 2006 UT 47); see 
also Sunridge, 2010 UT 6, Fn.8 ("The independent duty in Yazd was a duty to 
disclose known and material defects, not an independent duty to refrain from acting 
negligently")(emphasis added). 
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There was no evidence presented at trial that Mr. Yates knew of the defects 
the Reighards claim were present in their residence. In addition, the jury 
determined that Mr. Yates used reasonable care in determining whether the 
representations were true. (R.1446). 
Further, the Reighards presented no evidence at trial that the representations 
made by Mr. Yates were in fact not true. For example, the Reighards presented no 
evidence at trial that there was moisture behind the stucco at the time Mr. Yates 
sold the residence. The allegation that there was moisture behind the stucco 2 lA 
years after the residence was sold does not mean that there was moisture behind 
the stucco at the time of the sale. In fact, the Reighards own expert stated it was 
unknown when the water intrusion started. (R.1700 at p. 53). The Reighards also 
make no mention of the fact they altered the sprinklers, changed the landscaping, 
and built a deck in the years following the sale of the residence in claiming that 
Mr. Yates is responsible for the water intrusion in their home. (R.248-49, 360-61). 
Still further, the Reighards claim that Mr. Yates made representations in his 
Seller's Disclosures regarding building code violations. Due to the lack of citation 
in the Reighards' brief as to what section of the Disclosures to which they are 
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 Mr. Yates marked "no" to Section 10(c) of the Seller's Disclosures which state: 
"With the exception of regular maintenance of the exterior surfaces of the Property 
(painting, staining, etc.) are you aware of any past or present problems with any 
portion of the exterior, for example, moisture damage behind stucco, etc.?" (R.OOl 
(Complaint) at Exhibit "B," p.3). The Reighards claim this was a 
misrepresentation. 
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referring, Mr. Yates cannot adequately respond as there is no specific reference to 
building codes in the Disclosures. However, even if building code violations are 
part of the Seller's Disclosures, the Seller's Disclosures seek actual knowledge; 
there is no evidence Mr. Yates had such knowledge. 
Furthermore, neither the Reighards nor this Court can ignore the other 
holdings of Davencourt which established the duty of a builder, even in connection 
with new homes (in contrast with the instant matter, where it is undisputed the 
Reighards purchased a used home), is limited. Davencourt specifically held that a 
contractor does not have an independent duty to build in conformity with the 
building code and Utah does not recognize an independent duty to act without 
negligence in the construction of a home. Davencourt, 2009 UT 65, ff41,45-48. 
Specifically in regard to the breach of contract claim, the Reighards argue 
that the Special Verdict Form must have confused the jury. See Brief of Appellees 
and Cross-Appellants, pp. 47-48. While not only demeaning to the jury, this 
argument is pure speculation. The form of the verdict was not only reviewed by the 
Reighards' counsel but was also essentially their proposed form. (R.l 169 at 
Exhibit "A," p. 5). The Reighards' counsel expressly assented to the form of the 
verdict, waiving any appeals arising therefrom. (R.l702, p. 205)(Court: "any 
objections to other comments on the special verdict form?" Ms. Drage: "No, your 
Honor, thank you."). The Reighards' after-the-fact attempt to argue the inaccuracy 
23 
of the jury's factual findings on forms proposed by them cannot and should not be 
condoned. The jury heard the information provided and gave the weight to the 
information as they saw fit and this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of 
the Reighards' JNOV Motion.19 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
By this appeal, Mr, Yates asks this Supreme Court to rule that Mr. Yates had 
no independent duty to the Reighards as a builder/contractor because Mr. Yates 
was acting in the capacity of a seller of a used home when he contracted with the 
Reighards. The trial court's ruling that Mr. Yates owed an independent duty to the 
Reighards (and the trial court's denial of Mr. Yates' various motions in that regard) 
should be reversed. 
For the same reason, the trial court's denial of Mr. Yates' Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict should be reversed based upon the 
Davencourt opinion. Mr. Yates did not have a duty to act without negligence in 
the building of the home and there is no independent duty to conform to building 
codes. Further, because the jury found no physical injury and there was no 
admissible evidence of physical injury to Mr. Reighard and Aidan, the economic 
loss doctrine bars the Reighards' claims for negligence. The only plausible 
19
 The Reighards included additional information relating to required mediation of 
the case as part of their Partial Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
However, this information was not provided to the jury, and as such, has no 
bearing of the reasonableness of the jury's actions. (R.1502). 
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evidence respecting physical injury came through Dr. Cole; he should not have 
been allowed to testify as to the effects of mold on Mr, Reighard's and Aidan's 
health, and if his testimony had been properly excluded the economic loss rule 
would apply. 
In addition, because Mr. Yates was the prevailing party, and should be the 
sole prevailing party in this matter following the reversal of the negligence award, 
Mr. Yates should be awarded his costs and attorney fees under the REPC and the 
trial court's denial of these fees should be reversed. The trial court's award of 
costs to the Reighards should also be reversed under Utah R. Civ. P. 68, and Mr. 
Yates' costs should be awarded. 
Finally, Mr. Yates seeks this Court to affirm the trial court's denial of the 
Reighards' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, as the jury properly 
found in favor of Mr. Yates on both the negligent misrepresentation and breach of 
contract causes of action. Lastly, in the event it is not mooted by other holdings, 
this Court should affirm that the trial court also properly reduced the amount of the 
jury's verdict against Mr. Yates from $12,500.00 to $7,500.00 to reflect the 
settlement amount received by the Reighards by E. Marshall Plastering. 
Mr. Yates also seeks his costs and attorney fees incurred in this appeal, 
based upon the provision of the Real Estate Purchase Contract providing for 
attorneys fees. 
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